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Abstract 
To date, the role of evaluation in parliaments has merely been analyzed. This surprises as 
members of parliament are stakeholders ‘par excellence’, who could have an interest in 
evaluation. But do they? Via a systematic analysis of written questions and interpellations in 
Germany and Flanders we investigate MPs attention for evaluations. The following aspects 
are analyzed, from a comparative perspective: the content of questions on evaluation, the 
political profile of the MPs posing the questions, the share of questions on evaluation, and the 
distribution of questions over political parties, policy areas and over time.  
 
Points for Practitioners 
The role and use of evaluation in the democratic process might be enhanced. On the one side 
Members of Parliament might wish to be better informed on evaluation methods as well as on 
possibilities for using evaluation results for accountability and learning purposes. On the other 
side evaluators might strive for strengthening the demand for evaluation in the policy making 
process and not only public administration.  
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Introduction 
Both ex ante and ex post, the supply of policy information concerns a crucial instrument for 
parliament to fulfill its role. Besides a chain of delegation — from voter to administrator — 
feedback mechanisms are built in for the purposes of accountability and democratic control 
(Strøm, 2000). Although the predominance of political parties and, in many countries, 
coalition agreements influence heavily the way the parliamentary task is put into practice and 
the extent with which parliament can or does influence policy-making, the operation of 
institutional checks and procedures to gather information is crucial to the legitimacy of the 
democratic system.  
A key instrument used to gain insights into the conception, progress and results of 
policy is policy evaluation. Evaluation can be viewed as a structured process that creates and 
synthesizes information intended to reduce the level of uncertainty for stakeholders about a 
given program or policy. It is intended to answer questions or test hypotheses, the results of 
which are then incorporated into the information bases used by those who have a stake in the 
program or policy (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006). With this definition of evaluation, it is 
evident that members of parliament, as representatives of people who pay for and constitute 
target groups of policies, are stakeholders ‘par excellence’ and could have an interest in 
evaluation. But do they? This is a central question in this article. Specifically, we address the 
questions to what extent and how policy evaluation receives attention in parliament.  
To answer these questions we need to realize, in line with the abovementioned 
definition of evaluation, that evaluation will not be the sole source of policy information for 
members of parliament. Politics is continuously relying on various forms of expertise, which 
enter the political process through administrations, special committees, and commissions as 
well as informal networks. Evaluative information is available to parliamentarians in many 
different forms, including reports on managerial performance and policy context monitoring, 
policy research and evaluations. Chelimsky (2009: 52) calls the cross-branch politics and 
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overall ‘checks-and-balances’ architecture of government a “lofty arena in which the 
executive and legislative branches vie for power, engage in political partisanship, and direct 
ramified but well-aimed strikes on evaluative processes, outcomes, and reporting – especially 
reporting”.  
The weak institutionalization of evaluation in parliaments is striking. In the 
International Atlas of Evaluation (Furubo and Sandhal, 2002), the parliament shows the 
weakest degree of institutionalization of evaluation across all countries compared to, for 
example, the administration. Many parliaments only have modest resources and expert 
personal staff, making it less feasible to conduct evaluations by themselves.  
However, in many countries evaluation has become increasingly practiced within the 
executive branch, and parliaments indirectly have become more intense consumers of 
evaluative information, pushed by a discourse on evidence-based policy-making. This means 
that parliaments can be very active users of evaluation and still have no “institutional 
arrangements for conducting evaluations and disseminating them to decision makers” (Furubo 
and Sandahl, 2002:8). However, there are indications that general interest in evaluation rose 
within the parliaments. And parliaments do have the possibility of putting evaluation on the 
political agenda. For example, an imperative to carry out evaluations might be included in 
laws through sunset legislations or via the introduction of evaluation clauses. In fact, the 
evaluation of legislation is often triggered by the parliament (Bussmann, 2008; 2010), and the 
parliament can demand evaluations by means of a parliamentary procedural request. In these 
cases, the executive branch needs to deliver evaluations after a predefined period of time. 
Another way for parliament to trigger evaluation is by asking the supreme court of audit to 
conduct analyses that contain evaluation perspectives. More indirectly, members of 
parliament (MP) have the possibility to ask questions to ministers on policy evaluation, on its 
planning, content, progress, results, use, etc. In fact, this distinct interest for evaluation is part 
of the key role of parliament. Additionally, answers to MP’s questions can influence their 
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decisions within their legislating role. They can also refer to evaluations to underpin their 
legislative work.  
The role and use of evaluation in bureaucracies has been studied intensively, whereas 
the role of evaluation in parliaments has merely been analyzed. Also, evidence on how 
members of parliament use evaluative information is rather limited. Pollitt (2005:52) 
summarizes this in a literature review, stating “little research has been done on whether and 
how elected representatives use the performance information which is contained in evaluation 
reports, performance audits, quality assessments and inspections.” Horber-Papazian (2011) 
analyzed the introduction of performance contracts in the Swiss canton Valais for 
strengthening the role at the political level. She illustrates the asymmetry in the flow of 
information between parliament and executive, including the administration’s strategy to 
withhold information: “The process has a tendency to shine a spotlight on results obtained and 
areas of information that highlight success, convey a positive impression and maximize their 
room to manoeuver. In this context, parliament is clearly at a disadvantage and in an 
asymmetric position in terms of access to information and, hence also, in terms of power at its 
disposal” (2011: 142). Also, Johnson and Talbot (2007: 113) write about the UK: “[…] we 
find that parliament itself has been more challenged by performance reporting than 
challenging of the executive, despite attempts by parliament itself to institutionalize 
performance scrutiny.”  
  The use of evaluations within parliament is as difficult to trace as the use of evaluation 
in general. Sometimes MPs refer explicitly to evaluations conducted elsewhere. Caspari et al. 
(2003) documented the long path from a first interpellation in the German Bundestag 
concerning evaluating sustainability in development aid to a parliamentary decision nine 
years later. Hereafter, more interpellations followed and the committee on development aid 
continued to work on this issue.  
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In this article, the instrument of parliamentary questions and interpellations constitutes 
the unit of analysis for two cases: the Federal Parliament in Germany (Bundestag) and the 
Flemish Parliament in Belgium (Vlaams Parlement). The selection of the two cases follows 
the ‘most similar case’ design, as both countries are so-called consensual democracies and 
their party systems belong to the Benelux type of party constellation (Laver and Hunt, 1992). 
Both parliaments also cover a wide array of policy domains for which they are responsible. 
The only study on the institutionalization of evaluation in various countries, including 
comparative results for Belgium and Germany, shows a relatively low degree of 
institutionalization for both countries (Varone and Jacob, 2004). Yet, in both countries the 
evaluation culture is currently quite mature (cf. infra). 
Our research is based on the analysis of parliamentary documents, which allows for an 
insight into MPs interest in and use of evaluations. For the underlying research, evaluations in 
various policy areas are included. Due to varying systems of documentation, the research had 
to follow different steps of identification and analysis (cf. infra). Also, depending on their 
importance and use within the case, predominantly interpellations (Germany) or written 
questions (Flanders) have been analyzed. In general, the background for parliamentary 
questions is either ‘information-seeking’, ‘prelocutionary’ or both (Russo and Wiberg, 2010). 
In both cases, the chosen time period (2004-2009) covers one coalition period.  
Elaborating on the research question, the following aspects will be analyzed: the 
content of questions on evaluation, the political profile of the MPs posing the questions, the 
share of questions on evaluation in the total amount of questions, and the distribution of 
questions over political parties, policy areas and over time within the same legislature.  
 
Evaluation in the German Parliament (Bundestag) 
In Germany, where evaluation is embedded more procedurally than institutionally, the 
national influence is mainly limited to laws and the discretionary decisions of ministries. 
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There is not an overall national institutionalization of evaluation at the whole-of-government 
level. The influence of the Supreme Audit Institution (Bundesrechnungshof) has a rather 
indirect influence on evaluation because evaluation is more embedded in particular sectors, 
where reforms and policy shifts have led to a rise in the demand for evaluation and additional 
funding for evaluation research. 
The role of evaluation in parliament and government has risen, which can, for 
example, be illustrated by its inclusion in coalition agreements. In 2002, evaluation played a 
very minor role in the German federal coalition agreement (Koalitionsvertrag 2002). 
Thereafter, evaluation became much more integrated in reform projects as well as in pivotal 
policy areas. In 2005, evaluation played a role in seventeen policy areas of the coalition 
agreement, in which the parties of the government-elect clearly stated which programs or laws 
they intended to evaluate, particularly regarding in how far they intended to wait for 
evaluation results prior to further decision-making (Koalitionsvertrag, 2005). Within these 
coalition agreements, a clear timeframe for the evaluation was often indicated, e.g. after three 
years or in the middle of the electoral period. The government can thereafter be judged on its 
accomplished intentions to evaluate and some of the parliamentary questions refer to these 
promises.  
 
Institutional mechanisms in Parliament 
In the German Bundestag (German Parliament), evaluations are addressed in the form of 
motions, reports, major and minor interpellations, as well as oral and written questions. 
Questions addressed to the Federal Government enables a dialogue within the Bundestag. The 
following types of written questions are possible: 
- Written questions (‘schriftliche Fragen’): every MP can ask up to four written questions 
per month and the government should answer the questions within a week. Questions are 
to published weekly. 
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- Minor interpellations (‘kleine Anfragen’): the government has to answer written 
interpellations within a fortnight.  
- Major interpellations (‘große Anfragen’): Major interpellations usually consist of long 
lists of questions, sometimes more than two hundred relating to a specific area or topic. 
These are handed in by a fraction of the opposition or government parties, but 
alternatively can also be asked by a minimum of 5% of total MPs. It often takes a few 
months until the government answers these questions. The major interpellation is stronger 
in its effect because the government’s answer can be discussed in parliament. 
In the following text, ‘written questions’ refers to this first type, as explained above, although 
the questions in minor and major interpellations are also written, of course. 
 
Empirical scope 
For this analysis, a search for the central keyword ‘evaluation’i has been conducted within the 
Parliamentary Material Information System.ii This system includes all forms of written 
questions as well as their answers. In some answers, references to evaluations can be found 
even if it was not requested, but in this research only evaluation-related questions were 
analyzed. The timeframe for this research was the complete 16th legislative term from October 
2005 until October 2009. Germany is a federal republic and according to the subsidiarity 
principle, some policy fields are more dealt with at the Länder-level (regions). In this 
research, all questions and policy fields dominantly assigned to the federal level have been 
taken into account. The coding of policy fields followed the organization of federal ministries 
at that time. 
 
Analysis 
A look at the distribution of policy sectors shows that many evaluation-related questions 
occurred around interior policy, labor market and social policy, as well as education and 
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research policy. This was followed by the three policy sectors ‘transport, building and urban 
development’, foreign policy, and ‘family, elderly people, women and youth’. Within interior 
policy, many questions were about programs related to migration and integration issues. Since 
the large, so-called Hartz-reform, the labor market policy and social policy are constantly 
undergoing further smaller reforms and adaptations. The evaluation of the Hartz-reform was 
the largest evaluation of that decade and drove evaluation in the labor market sector (X, 
2012). Also, high political interest has been seen in recent years in the fields of education and 
research, and evaluation became a widespread practice here. These three policy fields have 
seen (political) novelties and evaluation became increasingly part of the governance. 
Similarly, the attention of MPs increased for evaluations within these policy sectors. This is 
also the case for the adjacent field of ‘family, elderly people, women and youth’. In those four 
policy fields the proportion of evaluation-related questions is relatively higher compared to 
the proportion of all questions per policy field. Another field with a relatively high number of 
evaluation questions is economic cooperation and development, which has the longest 
tradition and highest institutionalization of evaluation in Germany. So, the evaluation-related 
questions may on the one side reflect evaluation activity in the fields, but at the same time 
also reflect the current political interest and reform activities. Both are often going hand in 
hand. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In the 16th German Bundestag, there were five parliamentary groups: the Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Left Party (DIE LINKE), and the Alliance 90/the 
Greens (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN). CDU/CSU and SPD formed a grand coalition. The 
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initiative to ask questions related to evaluations came predominantly from the opposition 
parties (FDP, DIE LINKE, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN).  
What can we learn from the content analysis of the evaluation-related questions? The 
largest share of questions is on monitoring the evaluation activity of the government. The 
queries were often formulated as: ‘Is an evaluation of the new regulation (e.g.) planned? Who 
will conduct the evaluation? When can the evaluation results be expected?’ Accordingly, the 
answers generally briefly indicate an intention to evaluate. In case the evaluation has already 
been commissioned, the name of the institute is given, and the expected timeframe is 
presented. These types of questions and answers focus on holding the government 
accountable for carrying out evaluations, but as long as the evaluations are not further utilized 
it remains a purely symbolic and rhetorical ritual. For these questions and answers no 
parliamentarian even needs to read a single evaluation report. However, some questions go 
more into detail of monitoring evaluation activity by including questions on the evaluation 
design, methods and evaluation criteria to be used. For example, details on how to measure 
labor market effects of agro-genetic engineering or details on measurements of the target 
group of asylum seekers within EQUAL-partnerships was requested. In summary, it also 
shows that the expectation to evaluate has risen and the government needs to justify non-
evaluation activity by answering questions such as ‘why has this program or this question not 
been evaluated?’. 
A second category of questions solely focuses on requesting information mainly on 
the level of evaluation results. Questions are typically: ‘Is the government aware of an 
evaluation in the field x and what are the results?’ or ‘Are the results available and are they 
published?’. These types of questions are, on the one hand, also monitoring evaluation 
activity so that there might be an overlap between the first two categories, but, on the other 
hand, they request concrete information and disclosure. 
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
A third category of questions was asking for consequences from evaluation results, 
often in the sense of evidence-based decision making: ‘If there are first positive evaluation 
results, why is the government not acting accordingly?’, ‘What are the consequences of the 
evaluation results?’, ’In how far will the government follow the recommendations in the 
evaluation report?’.  
Finally, a few questions contested evaluation results, often combined with the question 
in how far the government agrees with the evaluation results. Those questions delved deeply 
into the evaluation design and results. For example, in one case it was assumed that the 
evaluators did not understand the concept, in another the stakeholder representation was put 
into question and also other stakeholder groups contesting the results were quoted.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Most questions on evaluation were included in minor interpellations. In 157 minor 
interpellations, generally between one and five questions were on evaluations. A few minor 
interpellations focused exclusively on evaluation. Thus, 5% of the minor interpellations 
included individual questions on evaluation whereas 33% of the 63 major interpellations 
included an interest in evaluation. When taking just the written questions into account the 
fraction of interest in evaluation within the major interpellation is much lower because they 
include an overall higher number of questions. That said, only 0.3% of the total number of 
questions within the 16th German Bundestag (12,789) touches on evaluation-related topics. So 
evaluation related questions are still not dominant. 
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As the major and minor interpellations are handed in by groups of MPs, specifically 
by political party fractions, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. For example, the names of 
the chief whips are usually included. Only written questions were handed in by individual 
MPs and, between 2005 and 2009, 28 MPs addressed questions on evaluation. Some asked 
two questions during this period and only one MP (Ina Lenke from the FDP) asked five, all of 
which have very different focuses. No personal preferences or specializations could be 
observed here. 
In absolute numbers, most of the questions on evaluation within major interpellations 
came from BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, whereas within minor interpellations DIE LINKE 
was the most active and the FDP issued the highest number of written questions. This pattern 
is following the overall varying use of the three different forms of activities across political 
parties. Therefore, it is not typical for evaluation-related questions, but rather follows general 
trends of opposition party activities. However, the relative amount of evaluation-related 
questions shows a higher proportion for the FDP in major interpellations, and for the 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN in minor interpellations. These data should not be 
overinterpreted, as one interpellation can contain different individual questions (evaluation 
related or not). However, MPs of the government parties handed in more than 2,800 written 
questions in total, but only three were related to evaluations. This is consistent with the 
generally lower interest in evaluative questions from the government side and the interest of 
the opposition parties to control the government. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
All three opposition parties are smaller fractions compared to the grand coalition 
government, and they do not vary much in their numbers of MPs. Accordingly, the opposition 
parties that control the government are responsible for between 29% and 38% per party of 
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overall evaluation-related questions. DIE LINKE has the highest number of questions per 
parliamentary seat, which is confirmed by the fact that the number of minor interpellations, in 
which category they have the highest number of questions, has a multiplier effect by 
including several questions in one single interpellation. 
Across the parties, DIE LINKE showed the highest interest in evidence-based 
decision-making, and questioned evaluation results (contesting) more in comparison to the 
other parties. However, it remains open if this is mainly driven by the control of opposition 
parties or perhaps by ideological preferences. To answer this question, research over multiple 
legislative terms needs to be conducted. 
 
Evaluation in the Flemish Parliament 
The Flemish Parliament constitutes the legislative power in Flanders, and is responsible for 
voting decrees, controlling their implementation and approving the budget of the Flemish 
regional government (25 billion euro). Since the seventies, several state reforms made the 
Flemish Parliament exclusively or partly competent for a growing array of policy issues 
relating to both persons and territory: language, culture, education, health, youth and family, 
spatial planning, environment, agriculture, housing, energy, local government, work, 
mobility, scientific research and even international affairs. 
 
Institutional mechanisms in Parliament 
The Flemish Parliament has several instruments at its disposal to fulfill its surveying power 
vis-à-vis the government. Next to a plenary weekly hour for ‘questions of the day’ MPs can 
ask for explanations from ministers within the parliamentary committees. Furthermore, 
written questions can be submitted that should receive an answer from the minister within 20 
days. To address a larger issue or problem, an MP can interpellate the minister. If the matter is 
of a general scope, it may be referred to the plenary session. In case the minister’s answer is 
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deemed unsatisfactory, the MP can submit a motion of distrust, disapproving the minister’s or 
government’s policy. When such a motion is approved by a majority of MPs, the government 
has to be replaced (without elections). MPs can also formulate recommendations, known as a 
motivated motion. If adopted, it constitutes an important political signal to the government, 
which is then considered to take it into account. The Flemish Parliament also has the right of 
inquiry: it can install a parliamentary committee of inquiry, an instrument that is, however, 
rarely used.  
Another institutional instrument at the disposal of the Flemish Parliament is asking the 
(federal) Court of Audit to conduct an audit or inquiry on one or more aspects of policy. Since 
1998 the Court of Audit is entitled to assess policies on the three E’s: economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness with so-called performance audits. However, the Flemish Parliament has 
only seldom made such a request (5 times in 10 years) (Vlaams Parlement, 2008).  
For the 2004-2009 legislature, a commission for ‘decree evaluation’ was established 
(Vlaams Parlement, 2010). However, its proceedings discovered that ‘decree evaluation’ is in 
the first place legalistically oriented towards better regulation rather than evaluation. Formal 
procedures of ‘regulatory impact assessment’ are operational but appear to not fulfill the role 
of real ex ante evaluation (SERV, 2006).  
The new president of the Flemish Parliament developed an action plan aimed at a 
better performing Parliament in its surveying role (Peumans, 2010). Besides goals relating to 
a more structured debate, also some new tools were announced that could contribute to the 
evaluating role of Parliament. In so-called topical debates, a specific issue can be evaluated 
more thoroughly by holding hearings with several stakeholders, after which a societal policy 
note is drafted.  
 
Empirical scope 
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In this article the empirical analysis is based on the written questions (and answers) during the 
legislature of 2004-2009.iii This legislature was characterized by the large-scale NPM-reform 
of the administration, which is expected to, and already demonstrated to, have an impact on 
interest in evaluation within the executive. Further (long-term) research should reveal whether 
MPs also will join in this trend.  
In the Flemish Parliament, written questions are the controlling instrument ‘par 
excellence’; they are what is most frequently used and are used more than all other 
parliamentary initiatives combined. The written character of the procedure allows for detailed 
questions and well-documented answers from the Minister. Being a primary tool, they often 
result in other parliamentary initiatives. Questions do not necessarily need to concern matters 
of general interest and they can also discuss issues that cannot be treated in committees or 
plenary sessions. There are few procedural rules and questions can be submitted in the entire 
parliamentary year, even within sabbatical periods (Vlaams Parlement, 2009). All these 
characteristics guarantee a comprehensive approach to our research subject. 
For reasons of feasibility, we selected a number of policy sectors, varying widely in 
budget and nature.iv The following eight sectors constitute our area of analysis:v education, 
agriculture, spatial planning, civic integration (including equal opportunities; anti-poverty 
policy, etc.), mobility, public works, and culture as well as finance and budget. 
To master the enormous amount of data, we predetermined key terms. Given the 
inconsistent use of concepts characterizing the evaluation field (Y, 2009), we deliberately did 
not restrict the analysis to questions in which the term ‘evaluation’ was explicitly used, but 
also included related terms that could actually refer to evaluations.vi A content analysis was 
subsequently conducted to filter the questions that relate to evaluation following the definition 
mentioned above. 
 
Analysis 
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When screening the number of evaluation-related MP questions per policy sectors, the 
following figure can be drawn up:  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In general, our analysis yielded a total of 180 relevant evaluation-related questions. The total 
number of (admissible) written questions during the 2004-2009 legislature was 11,822 
(Vlaams Parlement, 2009). Roughly, the eight policy sectors studied count for 43% of the 
total number of written questions.vii This means only 3.5% of the written questions, for this 
group of these policy sectors, focuses on evaluation.   
For most areas (mobility, public works, education, finance and budget) the number of 
questions focused on evaluation reflects the total number of questions per area. More 
evaluation-related questions might have been expected within the fields of spatial planning, 
civic integration and agriculture based on their total number of written questions. 
 The number of parliamentary questions on evaluation varies clearly across sectors. 
Within some high-ranked sectors, e.g. education, policy evaluation practice is already more 
developed. This can be confirmed in the case of the Flemish Parliament. The inverse 
reasoning also counts to some extent: younger policy domains, such as ‘civic integration’, are 
lagging behind in terms of attention for policy evaluation. Yet, ‘tradition’ or ‘age of the policy 
sector’ can definitely not explain the full picture. The area ‘finance and budget’ has 
traditionally strong links with policy evaluation, but there are hardly any MP questions with 
regard to policy evaluations in this domain. A possible explanation lies in its crosscutting 
links with other policy sectors. Based on international trends, one could also expect a high 
figure for the sector ‘agriculture’. After all, the European Union has played a major triggering 
role in terms of diffusion of policy evaluation in this sector, in the framework of the structural 
funds.  
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Mobility and public works instead excel in terms of the number of evaluation-related 
questions posed by MPs. The largely regional character of these sectors likely explains this 
high number in a regional parliament as Flanders. Politicians tend to be more interested in 
program, initiatives and actions that take place within their local electoral habitats, which 
causes them to ask a substantial number of ad hoc questions on these topics (see below). 
What is the focus of parliamentary questions? Evaluation practices can be classified 
along various axes. A first classic typology distinguishes evaluation practices according to 
their timing in the policy cycle. We can traditionally discern between ex ante evaluations 
(taking place prior to the actual policy decision), ad interim evaluations (taking place during 
the implementation stage of the policy) and ex post evaluations (taking place after the 
finalization of the policy), with the latter two both taking a retrospective perspective. Are MPs 
equally interested in both prospective and retrospective evaluation types? For the Flemish 
case about 70% of the questions could be classified in this way, and from this set a 
predominance of questions on retrospective evaluations is observed. However, the share of 
questions on either ex ante evaluation or retrospective evaluations varies along the policy 
sectors, possibly relating to differences in practice and types of evaluations conducted, types 
of problems and policy issues, etc. 
A clearer focus on written questions on evaluation can be determined in terms of the 
stage of the evaluation process to which a particular question relates. We can roughly 
distinguish questions about the initiation of an evaluation, the implementation of the 
evaluation, the results of an evaluation and the use of an evaluation. In the Flemish 
Parliament, the initiation, the results and the use of evaluations are of most interest to 
parliamentarians, and represent an almost equal share of the total amount of questions. The 
process of the evaluation itself is not really questioned. Again, one can notice variety among 
the different sectors studied. Four sectors in particular show a deviant pattern, in terms of a 
bias for a specific kind of question. MPs asking questions on evaluation in the field of 
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education are mostly interested in the use of evaluation (‘How are evaluation findings being 
translated into policy adaptations?’). On the other hand, domains such as public works, 
agriculture and mobility, find questions about the initiation of an evaluation (‘Has an 
evaluation been planned or started?’) to be more dominant.  
Apart from these four categories, a fifth frequently noticed type of question concerns 
whether an evaluation has been carried out or not: ‘Has this already been evaluated?’ With 
that kind of question MPs are often referring to evaluation clauses incorporated in legislation.  
Reference to specific evaluation techniques is only seldom made in written questions. 
In the 180 questions examined, we found one reference to cost-benefit analysis and one to 
multi-criteria analysis. The same observation holds for evaluation criteria. In the few 
instances where criteria are mentioned, reference is made to ‘efficiency’ and 
‘(cost)effectiveness’. Other criteria have not been named.  
Does party membership and status matter when it comes to parliamentary questions on 
evaluation? Flemish (and Belgian) politics excels in terms of ‘partitocracy’, meaning that 
political parties dominantly influence the policy making process and play a key role in both 
the legislative as well as the executive function. Some consider partitocracy as a major 
explanatory factor of why evaluation practice generally has difficulties in taking ground in the 
Belgian politico-administrative arena. Varone et al. (2005) for example argue that, since 
political decisions are often the result of difficult compromises between various coalition 
parties, it is generally not in the interest of the majority to question these compromises on 
objective grounds via evaluations.   
The following table shows the breakdown of our analyzed set of questions according 
to the respective parties, clustered in majority and opposition parties. Because larger parties 
have more MPs who could ask questions, we calculated the relative number of questions per 
parliamentary seat.  
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TABLE 5 HERE 
 
From the data, the assumption that questions on evaluation would mostly come from 
opposition parties is not supported. In fact, one of the majority parties has the highest number 
of questions per parliamentary seat while the two highest absolute numbers of questions also 
come from coalition parties. The number of evaluation-related questions of opposition versus 
majority is also in line with the total number of questions asked by the opposition and 
majority. Neither can a clear cut division between leftwing and rightwing parties come 
forward; leftwing parties (SP.A-Spirit and Groen!) vary from 0,40 to 2,17 questions per seat, 
while rightwing parties (VLD-Vivant, NV-A and Vlaams Belang) vary from 0,8 to 6,4 
questions per seat.   
When comparing each party’s share in the evaluation-related questions with its share 
in the total number of questions, the figures for NV-A are remarkable. As we will discuss 
below, the high figure of NV-A can be largely explained by the high interest of one particular 
MP. The comparison should also be made with care as there might be a bias stemming from 
the policy fields selection. The shares regarding the total number of questions encompass all 
policy fields contrary to the shares on evaluation-related questions. In other words, some 
parties could have a specific interest in the selected policy areas. 
Another explanation might be that MPs from coalition parties deliberately ask 
questions to ’their’ minister. The minister could then put his or her policy and initiatives in 
the spotlights. However, the data on written questions about evaluation do not support this 
rationale. Table 6 shows that in the majority of studied cases only a small percentage of 
questions comes from MPs of the same political party as the responsible minister. The 
percentage is higher for the Christian-Democrats (CD&V).  
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
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Is interest in evaluation a dedicated affair of a select group of MPs? Table 7 displays per 
political party the number of evaluation-related questions and the ratio of MPs asking these 
questions compared to the total number of MPs. Within most parties, asking questions on 
evaluation is done by a majority of the parliamentarians, and there are many examples of 
where the same MP addresses evaluation in more than one policy domain. Remarkably, 30 
out of the 45 questions from NVA stem from the same MP.viii Interestingly, this MP now 
chairs the Flemish Parliament. The action plan for an improved functioning of parliament 
reflects his particular interest in evaluation. Time will tell whether the plan will have an 
impact towards a diffusion of interest in evaluation among other MPs. 
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
A last question of analysis we touch upon is when MPs are primarily interested in evaluation. 
One indicator is the distribution of parliamentary questions in time during the period of the 
legislature examined. For Flanders we observe a top in the second year of the legislature and a 
slight emphasis in the number of questions during the first half of the legislature.  One 
possible explanation is that MPs have more questions on evaluation when new or adapted 
policies are being prepared. This observation is not necessarily contradictory with the fact that 
most questions relate to retrospective evaluations, since the latter are perfectly legitimate from 
a learning perspective when preparing new or adapted policies. 
 
Summary and Outlook 
Research on parliamentary questions itself is rather young (Martin 2011) and the role of 
evaluation in it is even younger. Although the research on the cases varied due to different 
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documentary systems for screening written questions, we can conclude with some 
observations and reflections from a comparative perspective.  
The analysis revealed that MPs ask evaluation-related questions in a wide array of 
policy sectors. The type of questions asked in Flanders concentrates on verifying whether an 
evaluation is initiated, its results, or its use. In Germany, many questions were also on holding 
the government accountable to undertake evaluation and not on the quality of evaluations. 
German MPs often do not ask for evaluation results, but more for process information, such 
as when the evaluation has started, who has been selected as evaluator/evaluation institute, 
and when the evaluation results will be expected. Questions on that level make evaluation 
rather a new discursive element in parliamentary discussions and monitoring of government 
activity rather than leading to an increased use of evaluative information, shaping evaluations 
or being a stimulus for methodological advancements. The spread of interest in evaluation 
across policy sectors can be explained by the evaluation activity in these sectors, and the 
importance of the topics on the national/regional political agenda.  
The distribution of questions on evaluation among MPs from government vs. 
opposition parties varies clearly between the two cases. In Germany, it is a matter of the 
opposition to ask for information on evaluation activities, whereas in Flanders, MPs from 
governing parties are highly active. Also, ministers receive questions on evaluation more from 
other majority parties than from their own party. 
Conclusions on interparty differences are difficult to draw since it remains unclear 
whether interest is directly related to the varying roles in the parliament (government vs. 
opposition) or more influenced by other factors, such as personal interest in evaluation or 
party culture and attitude toward ‘evidence-based policy-making’. On the basis of interviews 
with sixteen members of the Norwegian parliament, Nyborg (1998) identified a correlation 
between attitudes to cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) and political orientation. The left-wing 
parliamentarians interviewed were most skeptical and the conservatives the most positive vis-
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à-vis CBA. This was explained by the fact that the CBA was not perceived as ‘a political 
neutral tool for project analysis’. So, more qualitative research might shed more light on the 
interparty preferences vis-à-vis evaluation in general and specific approaches. 
Looking at the data from a political party perspective, we can conclude that 
parliamentary attention — measured by the number of questions on evaluation — is mostly in 
line with general intra-parliamentary dynamics. Deviant shares for specific parties seem to be 
largely the result of the activity and personal dedication of individual MPs. Both in Germany 
and Flanders some MPs became ‘political entrepreneurs’ for evaluation.  
The distribution of questions over the course of the legislative period showed 
dominance for the first half in Flanders while in Germany interest peaked in the middle of the 
term. On the one hand, one could argue that in the beginning of the legislature the preparation 
of new or adapted policies can trigger MP’s interest in evaluation, while on the other hand 
interest in evaluation could also rise only after certain policies become more mature after 
introduction.  
The latter also relates to the focus of the questions on evaluation. In Flanders more 
questions relate to retrospective evaluations compared to ex ante evaluations. In Germany 
very little attention of MPs goes to ex ante evaluation. Approaching the focus of questions in 
terms of the evaluation process, in both countries MPs ask questions in different stages: the 
initiation of an evaluation, the progress, the findings and on the use of results, but with 
variation among policy sectors.  
From this observation we can also conclude that attention to evaluation in parliaments 
does not directly mean that MPs are receptive to using evaluation to learn about the impact of 
policies and programs. Questions on evaluation are part of a broader controlling and 
monitoring role of parliament vis-à-vis government. Parliamentarians seem to push for 
evaluation, but in fact largely deal with it at the monitoring level. 
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Our research just sheds light on parts of the parliamentary work and how it is related 
to evaluation. The use of evaluative knowledge for policy development and budget decisions 
remains patchy and the use of evaluative findings for decision-making remains opaque. The 
underlying role of incentives and disincentives for the use of evaluative information as well as 
the secrecy in decision-making in parliaments needs further research (Stiglitz 1998). The 
relationship between the use of evaluative knowledge and evidence-based policy should also 
be analyzed across countries (Nutley et al. 2010). More research is needed to analyze the role 
of evaluation in the work of committees, in budget decisions and in other decision-making 
processes. Future research could also be conducted across various countries and parliamentary 
systems  — for example, on the Westminster system prototype of the United Kingdom and 
the semi-presidential political system of France — to cover political systems with other forms 
of institutional designs and to be able to analyze their respective influence on the role of 
evaluation in parliament. Additionally, comparative research across regions also should be 
undertaken to understand dynamics within the same nations and political systems.
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Notes 
i In German ‘Evaluation’ as wells as ‘Evaluierung’, both terms are used analogically. 
ii DIP, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/ 
iii Data have been analysed until April 2009. The 2004-2009 legislature officially ended in 
June 2009.  
iv [deleted for blind review]  
v The search engine did not allow us to make selections on ‘policy sectors’. We therefore 
proceeded in two steps to generate the data, first preselecting Ministers’ names and secondly 
screening for policy sectors since one single Minister can steer several policy sectors.  
vi We performed a content analysis of all questions which included (the Dutch equivalent) 
notions of ‘evaluation’, ‘planning’, ‘monitoring’, ‘pilot’, ‘benchmarking’, ‘experiment’, 
‘comparison’, ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘improvement’, ‘research’, ‘impact’, ‘audit’, 
‘analysis’, ‘follow-up’, ‘try-out’, ‘verify’, and their respective conjugations.  It must be said 
that most of the hits (also) were identified by the key term ‘evaluation’. 
vii The figures in the yearly reports of the Flemish Parliament are not accurate enough for 
detailed calculations since different clusters of policy areas are used.  
viii The MP concerned asked 170 written questions in total. His evaluation related questions 
thus counted for 17,6 percent. 
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Figure Fout! Alleen hoofddocument.: Overview of evaluation-related MP questions per policy sector 
 
 Source: Own elaborations 
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Table 1: evaluation-related questions by policy sector (German Bundestag, 16th legislation 2005-2009) 
 
 Major 
interpellations 
Minor 
interpellations 
Written questions Sum of all three 
types of 
questions 
Evaluation related 
questions overall 
policy field 
total 
no.  
no. 
including 
evaluation-
related 
questions  
total 
no.   
no. 
including 
evaluation-
related 
questions  
no. of 
written, 
oral and 
urgent 
questions 
no. of 
written 
questions 
on 
evaluation 
total 
no. percent 
total 
no.  percent 
foreign policy 15 5 205 11 1114 0 1334 7,1 16 7,4 
labor and social 
affairs 5 4 311 17 1280 8 1596 8,4 29 13,4 
education and 
research 0 0 174 19 588 4 762 4,0 23 10,6 
food, agriculture and 
consumer protection 1 0 139 6 773 1 913 4,8 7 3,2 
finance 1 1 325 5 2049 1 2375 12,6 7 3,2 
family, elderly 
people, women and 
youth 6 1 128 12 492 2 626 3,3 15 6,9 
health 0 0 141 10 716 1 857 4,5 11 5,1 
interior 11 2 590 28 1671 6 2272 12,0 36 16,7 
justice 5 3 124 4 562 2 691 3,7 9 4,2 
environment, nature 
conservation and 
nuclear safety 3 1 167 3 987 3 1157 6,1 7 3,2 
transport, building 
and urban 
development 3 1 437 16 2552 3 2992 15,8 20 9,3 
defense 2 1 202 3 930 1 1134 6,0 5 2,3 
economics and 
technology 6 1 238 7 1213 4 1457 7,7 12 5,6 
economic 
cooperation and 
development 3 0 46 11 175 1 224 1,2 12 5,6 
federal chancellor, 
federal press office 2 1 72 5 431 1 504 2,4 7 3,2 
 63 21 3299 157 15553 38 18895 100 216 100 
 
Source: own elaborations  
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Table 2: focus of evaluation-related questions within the 16th legislation of the German Bundestag 
 
major 
interpellation
minor 
interpellations 
written 
questions total percent
monitoring evaluation activity 18 116 19 153 62% 
requesting information 6 30 5 41 17% 
evidence-based decision making/ 
asking for consequences from evaluation 
results 4 28 14 46 19% 
contesting evaluation results 1 7 0 8 3% 
 29 181 38 248  
Source: own elaborations 
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Table 3: evaluation-related questions by political party “Evaluation” in the 16th Legislative Term  
(German Bundestag 2005-2009) 
 Government (Gov.)  Opposition (Opp.) Total 
Gov. 
Total 
Opp. 
 CDU/CSU 
and SPD 
CDU/C
SU 
SPD FDP Bündnis 90/ 
Die Grünen 
DIE  
LINKE 
others   
motion 7 1 0 16 13 6 0 8 35 
report, expertise, program 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 
major interpellation 1  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
minor interpellation 0 0 0 9 11 24 0 0 44 
oral question 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
written question 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 10 
total 13 1 0 29 30 34 1 13 94 
 
Source: Own elaborations 
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Table 4: Number of seats and questions on evaluation per political party 
 no. of seats 
share of seats per 
party 
no. of 
evaluation-
related 
questionsa  
share of 
evaluation-
related 
questions 
no. of 
evaluation-
related 
questions per 
seat 
CDU/CSU 226 37% 2 1% 0,01
SPD 222 36% 1 0% 0,00
FDP 61 10% 62 29% 1,02
DIE LINKE 54 9% 83 38% 1,54
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 51 8% 68 31% 1,33
total 614  216   
Source: own elaborations and Feldkamp (2011) 
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Table 5: Number of seats and questions on evaluation per political party 
 Political parties Number of 
parliamentary 
seats 
(d.d. 
13/6/2004) 
Absolute  
number of 
evaluation 
related 
questions 
Share per 
party in 
evaluation 
related 
questions  
Relative 
number of 
evaluation 
related 
questions per 
parliamentary 
seat 
Share per 
party in 
total 
number of 
questions  
Majority VLD-Vivant 
(“Liberals”) 
25 20 11% 0.80 12% 
CD&V 
(“Christian democrats”) 
29 54 30% 1.86 35% 
SP.A-Spirit 
(“Socialists”) 
25 10 6% 0.40 9% 
N-VA 
(“Flemish nationalists”) 
7 45 25% 6.40 13% 
Opposition Vlaams Belang 
(“Extreme rightwing”) 
32 30 17% 0.94 24% 
GROEN! 
(“Greens”) 
6 13 7% 2.17 5% 
Other Independent MP members 1 8 4% 8.00 1% 
 
Source: Own elaborations 
 
(*)During the legislature, the number of seats per party slightly reshuffled several times, with the transfer of 
some MP’s to other parties. Also some party cartels disintegrated during the legislature. 
(**)The figures in the last column refer to all questions, including also the policy fields which were not studied 
in this research. 
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Table 6: Questions on evaluation from Minister’s own party MPs 
Policy Sector  Party of  Minister 
Number of questions on evaluation 
from MPs of same party 
Share in total number of questions 
on evaluation per policy field 
Finance VLD-Vivant 1 12,5 
Spatial Planning VLD-Vivant 1 6,25 
Education SP.A 0 0 
Public works CD&V 10 22,7 
Agriculture CD&V 2 28,6 
Culture SP.A 2 10,5 
Integration VLD-Vivant 0 0 
Mobility SP.A 2 4,4 
 
Source: Own elaborations 
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Table 7: Spread of questions on evaluation among MPs per political party 
Political party Number of questions Share of MPs asking 
the questions 
VLD-Vivant 
(“Liberals”) 
20 12 / 25 = 48% 
CD&V 
(“Christian democrats”) 
54 19 / 29 = 66% 
SP.A-Spirit 
(“Socialists”) 
10 7 / 25 = 28% 
N-VA 
(“Flemish nationalists”) 
45 7 / 7 = 100% 
Vlaams Belang 
(“Extreme rightwing”) 
30 11 / 32 = 34% 
GROEN! 
(“Greens”) 
13 4 / 6 = 67% 
 
 
Source: Own elaborations 
 
 
